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Abstract 
In two experiments we provided evidence for a joint 
interference effect in picture naming. Participants took longer 
to name pictures when they believed that their partner 
concurrently named pictures than when they believed their 
partner was silent (Experiment 1) or concurrently categorized 
the pictures as being from the same or from different semantic 
categories (Experiment 2). However, picture naming latencies 
were not affected by beliefs about what one’s partner said. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that speakers 
represent whether another speaker is preparing to speak, but 
not what they are preparing to say.  
Keywords: joint task; co-representation; agent-conflict; 
language production; picture naming. 
 
In this paper we report results from two experiments that, 
for the first time, combined a highly constrained language 
task (picture naming), with a manipulation of the context in 
which the task is performed (i.e., whether the participant 
speaks concurrently with her partner or on her own). A 
similar rationale has been used by researchers who 
compared solo and joint SR compatibility effects (see 
Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011 for a review), but it 
has never been applied to picture naming. 
A well-known SR compatibility effect is the Simon effect. 
People are faster responding to “right” stimuli with their 
right hand and to “left” stimuli with their left hand 
(congruent trials) than they are responding to “right” stimuli 
with their left hand and to “left” stimuli with their right hand 
(incongruent trials). For example, people respond more 
quickly to the color of a stimulus when the stimulus (e.g., 
the photograph of a hand) is pointing towards the response 
hand than when the stimulus is pointing away from the 
response hand (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). 
A similar effect occurs when participants respond only 
with one hand, but they take turns with another participant 
who is seated next to them (i.e., they are slower when the 
pictured hand points towards the other participant than when 
it points towards themselves). This joint interference effect 
is interesting because the Simon effect is not observed (or is 
reduced) if participants respond with one hand and they 
perform the task on their own.  
The joint Simon effect has been interpreted as evidence 
that participants represent their partner’s potential response 
and that this representation interferes with their own 
response on incongruent trials (because the two responses 
are incompatible, in the same way as a response with one’s 
right hand is incompatible with a response given with one’s 
left hand). We refer to this as the co-representation account 
of joint interference effects. Interestingly, joint 
compatibility effects were found when participants sat alone 
but were led to believe another person performed the task 
with them. This occurred even when no feedback was 
available (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011). 
The co-representation account has been challenged. Here 
we are particularly interested in an alternative account put 
forward by Wenke et al. (2011), the agent-conflict account. 
According to this account, representing that one’s partner is 
(potentially) about to respond on the current trial interferes 
with one’s own response. However, this occurs because 
there is a conflict regarding whose turn it is to respond, 
rather than because of incompatibility between one’s own 
and one’s partner’s response. In fact, congruent responses 
should lead to similar amounts of interference as 
incongruent responses. 
Joint interference effects have been almost exclusively 
investigated in manual tasks (e.g., Simon task, Flanker task, 
SNARC task), with only two studies using verbal responses 
(Philipp & Prinz, 2010; Pickering & MacLean, 2013) and 
none looking at picture-naming responses. Importantly, 
picture-naming responses are subject to varying degrees of 
congruency. For example, if one participant names the 
picture of an apple, her partner could either concurrently 
produce the same word (i.e., apple), or they could 
concurrently produce an unrelated word (e.g., blouse), or a 
related word (e.g., banana). 
These different degrees of congruency do matter in solo 
tasks, as shown by several picture-word interference studies. 
Speakers who name pictures while ignoring distractor words 
are fastest when the distractor word is the picture’s name. 
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They are slower when the distractor is a different word and 
slowest when it is a different but semantically related word. 
The difference in naming latencies between trials with 
unrelated distractors and trials with related distractors is due 
to interference between co-activated lexical representations 
(Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). 
In our study, participants saw pairs of pictures rather than 
picture-word pairs. When distractor words are replaced by 
distractor pictures, semantic interference effects generally 
disappear (Damian & Bowers, 2003), possibly because 
distractor picture names are not routinely retrieved or their 
activation is too weak to out-weight facilitatory effects at 
the conceptual level. We therefore asked participants to 
name both pictures in a pair, a task that is subject to 
semantic interference effects (Aristei, Zwitserlood, & Abdel 
Rahman, 2012).We asked whether the time they took to 
respond might be affected by a representation of their 
partner’s concurrent response. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, a red and a blue picture were 
simultaneously displayed to two participants seated in 
different rooms. Before the pictures appeared, an instruction 
screen showed the names of the two participants 
accompanied by the words red, blue, or no. Red and blue 
corresponded to “go” trials: the participant was instructed to 
name the picture presented in the given color first, and then 
also name the other picture. No corresponded to “no-go” 
trials: The participant was instructed to give no response. 
We varied the order in which the other participant (the 
partner) was concurrently naming the pictures (Partner’s 
task), as follows. On trials on which the two participants 
were assigned the same color, they named the pictures in the 
same order, therefore producing the same verbal response 
(SAME condition). On trials on which the two participants 
were assigned different colors, they named the pictures in 
reversed order, therefore producing different verbal 
responses (DIFF condition). Finally, when either of the 
participants was assigned a “no-go” cue, one participant 
named the pictures while their partner produced no response 
(NO condition). See Figure 1 (top) for examples (with apple 
in blue, blouse in red). 
In addition, we introduced a second manipulation, 
orthogonal to Partner’s task. Participants saw either two 
semantically related (e.g., apple – banana) or two unrelated 
pictures (e.g., apple – blouse). This served two purposes. 
The first was to provide a manipulation check. When two 
semantically related lexical items are activated concurrently 
(e.g., when speakers are asked to say “apple” and “banana” 
in close proximity), they interfere with one another (Aristei, 
et al., 2012). We therefore expected longer latencies when 
participants named two related than when they named two 
unrelated pictures (a main effect of semantic relatedness). 
Most importantly, we expected Partner’s task to affect 
naming latencies. Specifically, if the co-representation 
account can be extended to naming responses, it could be 
taken to predict that speakers represent the content of their 
partner’s response and activate the corresponding lexical 
representations.  
 
Figure 1: Sample trial (top) and hypothesized effects 
according to the three accounts. 
 
Note that, because the speakers always named both 
pictures, their utterances always contained the same lexical 
items. However, when the order differed, the picture that the 
speaker named second was the picture that their partner 
named first.  
Therefore, in the DIFF condition the representation of the 
partner’s response might enhance the activation of the 
second picture’s name. This would in turn result in greater 
competition between the two pictures’ names. Instead, when 
the order is the same, the first picture’s name was the word 
that one’s partner also named first. Therefore, its activation 
level might be raised and competition with the second 
picture’s name could be reduced. Overall, we should find 
longer naming latencies in the DIFF condition than in the 
SAME condition.  
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This scenario is presented in Figure 1 (panel A). The 
nodes represent lemmas in Mary’s mental lexicon. On the 
right is a snapshot of the activation level of the nodes apple 
and blouse just before the onset of the word “apple” when 
Mary is preparing to utter “apple blouse” (unrelated case), 
under the different conditions. The degree of activation is 
indicated by the thickness of the circles. Pointed arrows are 
excitatory connections, rounded arrows are inhibitory 
connections. 
In addition, the degree of relatedness might also matter 
(and this was the second purpose of the relatedness 
manipulation). Specifically, if other-representations are 
content-specific, the semantic interference effect could be 
enhanced in the DIFF compared to the SAME condition. 
Alternatively, speakers might not represent the content of 
their partner’s response, but they might represent whether 
their partner responds on the current trial or not (agent-
conflict account). If so, the relationship between self- and 
other-representations would not affect processing, and hence 
naming latencies would be comparable in the SAME and 
DIFF conditions. For the same reason, there should be no 
interaction between Relatedness and Partner’s task. 
However, naming latencies should be longer in the SAME 
and DIFF conditions than in the NO condition. This 
scenario is presented in Figure 1 (panel B). 
Finally, people might not represent other people’s 
responses. Note that our participants could not interact: 
They named pictures alongside each other, but could not 
hear each other. Whereas several studies have shown that 
non-interacting participants display joint interference effects 
(see above), they all used manual responses. We do not 
know whether the same would be true for verbal responses, 
particularly because language is perhaps more tightly linked 
to communicative situations compared to manual actions. If 
the Partner’s task manipulation has no effect (i.e., no 
difference between the SAME, DIFF, and NO conditions), 
we would conclude that another person’s utterances are not 
represented under the conditions tested in our experiment. 
This scenario is presented in Figure 1 (panel C) as the no-
representation account. 
Method 
Participants Twelve pairs of previously unacquainted 
participants were recruited from the University of 
Edinburgh student community. All reported to be native 
English speakers and had no speaking or reading 
difficulties. They were paid £6 in return for participation. 
 
Materials Fifty line drawings of everyday objects and 
animals were paired twice to yield 50 picture-picture pairs 
(25 semantically related, 25 semantically unrelated).  
 
Design and Procedure Partner’s task (henceforth, Partner; 
SAME vs. DIFF vs. NO) and Relatedness (unrelated vs. 
related) were manipulated within participants and within 
items. An item was defined in terms of the first named 
picture (so apple-blouse and blouse-apple counted as 
different items). Partner varied on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Each participant named a given item once per condition. 
Pictures were presented into 4 different blocks of 100 trials 
each. Each block comprised an equal number of trials in 
each condition for both participants. The order of 
presentation was pseudo-randomized, separately for each 
pair and for each block, with the constraint that the same 
picture never appeared on two consecutive trials. (The order 
of blocks was counterbalanced across pairs). In addition, we 
counterbalanced within each block and for each participant 
the color of the first named picture (blue or red) and the 
position of the cue (top or bottom half of the screen). 
Participants were tested in adjacent soundproof booths. 
They were seated in front of computer monitors connected 
to the same machine in the control room (so stimulus 
presentation was simultaneous). There was a window 
between the two rooms, but participants could perceive each 
other only peripherally when facing the monitors. 
Upon entering the lab, participants were introduced to one 
another and taken into the booths. After learning the picture 
names individually, they were told that they would “work 
together”; instructions were delivered to both participants at 
the same time in the control room. Participants then returned 
to the booths and, after performing 20 practice trials, began 
the experimental phase. A sample trial is shown in Figure 1 
(top). A session lasted about 1 hour. 
 
Recording and Data Analysis An inaudible beep marked 
stimulus presentation and was recorded together with the 
participants’ responses (on three separate channels), using a 
multi-channel M-Audio FireWire 1814 device (inMusic, 
Cumberland, RI, www.m-audio.com) and Adobe Audition 
(Version 4.0; sampling rate: 48000 Hz). Beep onsets were 
automatically tagged using Audacity (Version 1.2.5). 
Recordings were pre-processed to reduce background noise. 
Speech onsets were tagged using the Silence finder 
algorithm in Audacity and manually checked (for lip 
smacks, etc.). Naming latencies were defined as the time 
from beep onset to the onset of the participant’s response. 
The data were analyzed using Generalized Linear mixed-
effects models (Bayeen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) in R 
(Version 2.7.2) with a logistic link function for categorical 
data (Jaeger, 2008). All predictors were contrast-coded. For 
Partner, we defined two planned contrasts: naming vs. no 
compared the DIFF and SAME conditions against the NO 
condition; same vs. different compared the SAME against 
the DIFF condition. 
Fixed and random effects were selected using backward 
selection. If the model with full random structure did not 
converge we simplified it by removing higher order terms 
(first by subjects, then by items). The alpha-level for 
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likelihood-ratio tests was set to .05 for fixed effects, to .1 for 
random effects
1
. 
Latencies were analyzed only if both pictures were named 
correctly. Incorrect responses included: naming errors (the 
wrong name was used), disfluencies, order errors (the name 
of the second picture was uttered first and vice versa), 
missing responses. Latencies longer than 3000 or shorter 
than 300 ms were considered outliers and excluded. 
Latencies more than 3 standard deviations from the by-
participant mean (1.5%) were replaced with the cut-off 
value. 
Results 
Accuracy Speakers produced (marginally) fewer 
incorrect responses when naming related than unrelated 
pictures (χ2(1) = 3.54, p= .06).  
 
Table 1: % incorrect in Exp. 1. 
 
 DIFF SAME NO 
Unrelated 7.9% 6.8% 6.3% 
Related 8.1% 5.3% 4.9% 
 
Table 2: Best fit for accuracy data in Exp. 1. 
 
Predictor Estimate SE Z 
Intercept -3.10 .18 -16.97 
naming vs. no    .24 .11    2.23 
same vs. different    -.23 .08   -2.75 
related vs. unrelated   -.31 .15   -2.05 
Random effect Explained variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept    .48 
Items: intercept    .48 
Items: Relatedness     .56 
 
Interestingly, the likelihood of producing an incorrect 
response was affected by Partner (χ2(2) = 13.10, p<.01): 
They produced more incorrect response when their partner 
was naming than when their partner was silent and also 
fewer incorrect responses in the SAME than in the DIFF 
condition (see Table 1 and 2). 
 
Naming latencies Participants took longer to name 
semantically related than unrelated pictures (χ2(1) = 11.32, 
p<.001). Crucially, Partner affected naming latencies (χ2(2) 
= 7.80, p<.05): Latencies were longer when the partner was 
naming than when he was silent. However, the DIFF and 
SAME conditions did not differ. Finally, Relatedness and 
Partner did not interact (see Table 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Analyses that included random slopes for the factor of interest 
(Partner), for both items and subjects, yielded the same pattern of 
results as the ones reported here. 
Table 3: Mean latencies in Exp. 1. 
 
 DIFF SAME NO Tot 
Unrelated 869 869 855 864 
Related 881 886 872 880 
Tot 875 877 864  
Semantic 
interference 
 
 -12 
 
 -17 
 
 -17 
 
 -16 
 
Table 4: Model for naming latencies in Exp. 1. 
 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 874 24 36.72 
naming vs. no   14   5   2.79 
same vs. different     1   4     .17 
related vs. 
unrelated 
  16   5   3.36 
Random effect Explained variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept 11980 
Items: intercept   3150 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that beliefs about another’s task can 
affect the latency of picture-naming responses, and are thus 
not consistent with the no-representation account. We take 
this as evidence that speakers represented that their partner 
was about to speak. More precisely, our results do not 
support the co-representation account. Though participants 
made more errors when their partner prepared an 
incongruent (DIFF) than a congruent (SAME) response, this 
pattern was not confirmed by latency data. In addition, 
while there was a clear semantic interference effect, which 
replicated previous findings (Aristei, et al., 2012), the effect 
was no greater in the DIFF (12 ms) than in the SAME 
condition (17 ms). These results are consistent with the 
agent-conflict account, as participants took longer to 
respond when they believed their partner also prepared to 
respond. 
However, we must consider alternative explanations. Note 
that the slowest conditions (SAME and DIFF) are the ones 
in which two “go” instructions are displayed on the screen. 
Participants might be distracted by their partner’s instruction 
more if it is a “go” instruction than if it is a “no-go” 
instruction, perhaps because “go” instructions are more 
similar to each other than they are to “no-go” instructions. 
This might cause interference between memory 
representations for one’s own and the partner’s instructions. 
Participants rarely performed their partner’s task by 
mistake, which seems to suggest that they had little trouble 
remembering instructions. However, this occurred more 
often in the DIFF (on 2.3% of trials speakers named the 
pictures in their partner’s order) than in the NO condition 
(on 1.2% of trials speakers gave no response). But more 
importantly, this explanation cannot account for the fact that 
latencies were equally long in the SAME as in the DIFF 
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condition (as in SAME instructions were identical). We 
return to this issue after Experiment 2. 
We conclude that participants experienced interference 
whenever their partner responded concurrently, because 
they represented whether it was their partner’s turn to 
respond. But what sort of mechanism could be responsible 
for this interference effect? The process of “imagining” that 
one’s partner is about to respond might draw away 
attentional resources from the picture-naming task. If this is 
the case, “imagining” one’s partner performing any task 
should slow down latencies to the same extent as 
“imagining” them naming. 
However, it is also possible that interference arises 
because the same mechanisms (i.e., language production 
mechanisms) are used to represent one’s partner naming 
response and to prepare one’s own naming response. If this 
is the case, we predict less interference when one’s partner 
is preparing a different (non-naming) task than when one’s 
partner is preparing a naming response. Experiment 2 was 
designed to decide between these alternative explanations. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we replaced “no-go” trials with a semantic 
categorization (CAT) task. The SAME and DIFF conditions 
were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. In the CAT 
condition, partners were instructed to judge whether the two 
pictures belonged to the same semantic category or to 
different semantic categories. They responded by saying 
“yes” or “no” into the microphone.  
Thus, all trials required a response from both participants. 
If imagining one’s partner performing any task was driving 
the effect we observed in Experiment 1, we should now find 
no difference between the SAME, DIFF and CAT 
conditions. Note that both the CAT task and the naming task 
involve visual processing of the pictures and retrieval of the 
concepts associated with the depicted entities from memory. 
In addition, both tasks require articulation of an overt verbal 
response.  
Crucially, however, only the naming task engages 
language production mechanisms (and specifically the 
retrieval of the picture’s name). Therefore, if the 
interference effect in Experiment 1 is due to a representation 
that one’s partner is preparing a naming task, we should 
replicate it in Experiment 2. 
Method 
Sixteen new participants from the University of Edinburgh 
student community were recruited. Materials, design and 
procedure were as in Experiment 1, except that the CAT 
condition replaced the NO condition. For the semantic 
categorization task, participants were told that when they 
saw the word question (which replaced the word no) next to 
their name, they were to respond to the following question: 
“Are the two pictures from the same category?” Data were 
analyzed as in Experiment 1; latencies exceeding the 3SD-
threshold amounted to 1.7% of the data. 
Results and Discussion 
Categorization Task Participants responded correctly on 
94.7% of the unrelated trials and on 93.6% of the related 
trials (a non-significant difference).  
 
Accuracy Speakers produced (marginally) more incorrect 
naming responses to related than unrelated pictures (χ2(1) = 
2.98, p=.08). More importantly, Partner did not affect the 
likelihood of producing an incorrect response (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: % incorrect in Exp. 2. 
 
 DIFF SAME CAT 
Unrelated 5.6% 6.3% 6.0% 
Related 7.2% 7.1% 5.8% 
 
Naming latencies Participants took longer to name 
semantically related than unrelated pictures (χ2(1) = 11.04, 
p<.001). As in Experiment 1, Partner affected latencies 
(χ2(2) = 6.54, p<.05): They were longer when participants 
believed their partner named pictures than when they 
believed their partner categorized the pictures. However, the 
DIFF and SAME conditions did not differ and Relatedness 
and Partner did not interact (see Table 6 and 7). 
 
Table 6: Mean latencies in Exp. 2. 
 
 DIFF SAME NO Tot 
Unrelated 881 879 874 878 
Related 898 907 885 897 
Tot 889 893 880  
Semantic 
interference 
 
 -17 
 
 -28 
 
 -11 
 
-19 
 
Note that in Experiment 2 two “go” instructions were 
displayed on every trial, including in the CAT condition; 
therefore, interference could not have been due to greater 
interference between memory representations for more 
similar instructions.  
The results of Experiment 2 are not consistent with the 
co-representation account. As in Experiment 1, naming 
latencies were very similar in the DIFF and SAME 
condition. In addition, and unlike in Experiment 1, the 
likelihood of incorrect responses was very similar in the two 
conditions (and did not differ significantly from the CAT 
condition, either). Finally, the semantic interference effect 
was not larger in the DIFF than in the SAME condition. 
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Table 7: Model for naming latencies in Exp. 2 
 
Predictor Estimate SE t 
Intercept 884 24 36.77 
naming vs. no   12   5   2.47 
same vs. different     3   4     .70 
related vs. unrelated   19   5   3.48 
Random effect Explained variance estimate 
Subjects: intercept 16490 
Subjects: Size
2
 13080 
Items: intercept 46670 
Items: Relatedness   4380 
 
Most importantly, we found that naming latencies are 
longer when speakers believe that their partner is also 
naming a picture than when they believe their partner is 
performing a semantic categorization task. Given that the 
two tasks share all processing stages except lexical retrieval, 
we conclude that the process of naming pictures is inhibited 
by the belief that another speaker is concurrently retrieving 
the pictures’ names. 
Conclusion 
We showed that people represent their partner’s task in a 
joint picture-naming task. The evidence is not consistent 
with the co-representation account of joint task effects. 
Participants did not form content-specific representations of 
their partner’s response. It is possible that this finding is 
limited to the conditions tested in this study. Interlocutors 
might form content-specific representations when engaged 
in a conversation (when they rarely speak at the same time). 
In addition, the amount of practice and repetition that 
characterizes picture naming experiments could have 
masked content-specific effects (perhaps because activation 
was already at ceiling). Future studies should consider these 
limitations. 
However, our results are consistent with a version of the 
agent-conflict account, in which interference in naming 
responses is due (at least partly) to the belief that one’s 
partner is preparing a naming response (as opposed to any 
response). This is consistent with the idea that people 
represent others’ utterances using some of the mechanisms 
they use in preparing their own utterances (i.e., language 
production mechanisms; Pickering & Garrod, in press). 
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